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From Power to Biopower 
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Abstract :  
 
The concept of « power » plays an important role in Michel Foucault’s critic of the 
classical model of sovereignty. This paper shows how “power” is related to 
“normalisation” in Surveiller et punir and in La volonté de savoir. Power is not only the 
way by which somebody acts on the action of somebody, but also a systemic property 
emerging in a social network. It emerges as a collective strategy, without any strategist, 
and without any subject. One could call this a “constructive” property.  
However, “biopower” is not simply “power”. It is an “extension” of it. In La volonté de 
Savoir, Foucault tries to understand how biopower will organise a human social 
network, in which biological constraints are “reflected” by political ones. Human species 
is not simply the expression of a natural kind, but also the result of a social and of a 
political construction. This paper analyses this important change in Foucault’s 
philosophy of power.  
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Introduction 
 
The question of power in Foucault‟s work will be asked by us between 1975 and 1976. In this 
period, Foucault examines general punishment and sexuality “systems” as social and 
technological devices: the so called “Dispositif” (Foucault, 1976, Ch. IV). “Dispositifs” are 
not “Disciplines”. Disciplines are fitted to individuals. They are tactical tools. A “Dispositif” 
is a strategic social and technical device. It concerns the organisation of a human society at a 
certain period of its history.  
It expresses a big evolution in Foucault‟s vocabulary, since a “Dispositif” is also not a simple 
“Episteme” (Foucault, 1966). An “Episteme” is a truth regulation system (“Un régime de 
vérité”), like the one in which the human being becomes to be analysed and studied through 
various and differentiated human and social sciences. In such a system, what is true and false 
is constructed by it. It doesn‟t mean that truth is only a name; it better reveals that truth is 
nothing but an event constructed by the system of truth. That is the first level of nominalism: 
truth is nothing but a constructive discursive property present in a discursive system. Yet there 
is now a second one: the truth regulation system is also an event in a more complex social, 
historical and political system of norms, a “Dispositif” characterized as such through the so-
called “relation of power”.  
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We will insist on two points in this essay. Firstly, we will show that “Power” is nothing for 
Foucault but a “relational” and systemic “strategic situation” (1976, p 123). And we will show 
that such a description of the relation of power is in continuity with a certain French tradition, 
coming from Gilbert Simondon, Georges Canguilhem, and in dialog with the French Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser that published “Lire le capital” in 1965. Like Canguilhem insists 
on “normativity” and Simondon on “individuation”, Foucault will insist on “normalisation”.  
Yet “normalisation” is not a simple repressive regulation, like in the judiciary system. A norm 
is not a law, and prison is not simply a punishment. Normalisation deals with “information” 
and “control”: “Notre société n‟est pas celle du spectacle, mais de la surveillance » (Foucault, 
1975, p 219).  
In a « Dispositif » there is a specific systemic tool: “a transformation matrix” (1976, p 131) 
through which Power switches into Knowledge and Knowledge also switches into Power. 
Such a device doesn‟t exist in physics and in biology. It expresses a specificity of human 
societies. It explains why the relation of power cannot be reduced to economic exchanges, or 
to communication.  
 
Secondly, normalisation is the result of a first strategy. It is an answer to this first question: 
how to build a complex structure with living human machines, or how to put human souls and 
autonomy in a complex structure? It can also be considered in a way as an economic question: 
how to produce a new human capital that will work better in the future. Yet, a new 
transformation matrix operates in La Volonté de Savoir. It switches Power into Biopower. 
What is controlled here, is not only our individual body (“l‟âme prison du corps”), or the 
human society understood as a “population”1. It is nothing but “natural life” or “biological 
traits”. Through, demography, insurances, but also medicine, the strategy is now to make a 
better human species, and not only a better society.  In this new normalisation process, 
“biology is reflected in politics” (1976, p 187). In Foucault‟s perspective, the sexual 
technological and social device is at the centre of this new strategy, which is a strategy 
without any strategist, like in every normalisation process. This strategy involves what he 
calls “le droit de faire vivre”. It means that this new form of sovereignty acts as a control 
device on the birth of future generations, on the existence of humanity as a natural kind, and 
not only as a social entity.  
 
It is of no doubt that the “microphysical” analysis of the contemporary human society, as a 
society of information and control, is permitted by a big historical change coming form the 
Modern period in Occident. The political sovereignty is a democratic one, with a state of law 
and democratic institutions. It is not an absolute Monarchy anymore. Foucault never argues 
that the relation of power vanishes at this macrolevel. He just tries to understand, why we are 
not only equals in front of the law, but also unequal in front of various “microrelations” of 
power, like the relation between parent‟s and children, or between the physician and the 
patient. Microphysics of social forces doesn‟t erase macrophysics of Power. And the political 
sovereignty understood as a relation of representation works in the occidental society. Yet the 
efficiency of the power is not at this level, for Foucault. It is at the level of a strategy without 
any strategist. Finally, we will ask a simple question: would it be also the case with biopower. 
Can we accept the idea that the relation with future generations can only be a relation of 
information and control? We will show finally that it is not the case today. And we will take 
two examples: the qualification of reproductive cloning as a crime against human species in 
the last revisions of the French laws of Bioethics (2004), and the version of the Precautionary 
Principle now integrated in the French Constitution. 
                                                 
1 The population itself is not a fact or an object. Is is a subject/object: “ ce sujet/objet nouveau qu‟est la 
population” (Foucault, 2004b, p78). 
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1- A genealogy of power 
 
One possible description of the relation of power is the Sovereignty’s pattern. Through it, the 
relation between sovereign and subjects is understood as a “representative” one. And, as a 
juridical system of laws, the State is also constructed on the relation “interdiction- 
punishment”. Foucault will not deny this point. Let’s take briefly in consideration three 
different models of sovereignty: the Leviathan (Hobbes), the “Contrat Social” (Rousseau), 
and Democracy based on Popular Sovereignty (Tocqueville).  
The first one emphasizes the reciprocity between rights and obligations, as a result of a 
contract through which humanity overcomes the so-called state of war. “Natural rights” lead 
to the activation of a “will of power”, just in order to secure our own liberty. And this will of 
power leads to a perpetual war between human beings. It is opposed to a fundamental “law of 
Nature” (Hobbes, 2009, Ch 14), which requires for men “to seek peace and follow it”. Thus, 
the state of Nature is unstable, and we have to face our own obligations, through an artificial 
convention, by which we abandon our natural rights, to our Sovereign or “Leviathan”, by 
means of mutual conventions between each of us.  
The second one insists on the concept of “General Will” (“Volonté générale”). It is based on 
the idea that the Sovereign must also be its own Subject: “chacun de nous met en commun sa 
personne et toute sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale ; et nous 
recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout” (Rousseau, Contrat 
Social, L1, Ch 6, 1992). « General Will” is nothing but the concept of “Republic”; it means 
that legislative power must only belong to people. However, even in a direct democracy, 
people are human beings with various and opposed intentions and interests. They are not a 
single will. General Will is an abstract concept that cannot work.   
Considering the third one, Democracy is “the popular sovereignty” governed by 
“representatives”, and not by itself. Such a concept can be applied and it erects citizens as 
juridical and political “subjects”, since the representatives are elected by “universal 
suffrage”. Democracy is not simply defined by a certain norm of justice; it is better 
characterised by the relation between this norm of justice and a procedural condition: the 
universal suffrage. Yet, for Foucault, such a relation creates a gap between the representatives 
and the people that is expressed by the separation between the State and the Society. It defines 
what Foucault would call a “macropower”. It works, but just at a certain level and with a 
certain meaning.  
Through this equality between rights and obligations, and between citizens and 
representatives, what is going on concerning the judiciary system? The judiciary system 
attests that we are all subjects of law, and with the same rights, and it is based on an external 
and repressive relation between interdiction and punishment, that excludes a part of the 
society. Thus it can hardly be an immanent one. What we must understand is not the 
“sovereignty”, but the so-called “assujettissement”:  
 
“Le corps ne devient force utile que s’il est à la fois corps productif et corps assujetti. Cet 
assujettissement  n’est pas obtenu par les seuls instruments soit de la violence soit de 
l’idéologie ; il peut très bien être direct, physique, jouer de la force contre la force, porter sur 
des éléments matériels, et pourtant ne pas être violent ; il peut être calculé, organisé, 
techniquement réfléchi, il peut être subtil, ne faire usage ni des armes ni de la terreur, et 
pourtant rester de l’ordre physique » (Foucault, 1975, p 31).  
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Power is not “ideology”. Foucault is not Marxist, even if partially inspired by some 
Althusser’s ideas and developments. He refuses that “our social being” could determine “our 
consciousness”, and that economic conditions (infrastructures; “Basis”) could finally only 
explain how the society is changing. He doesn’t admit like Marx, that Moral, Religion and 
Metaphysics don’t have any “historical development” 2. 
Politics is not economy, and the relation of power, is not a simple relation of exchange. It can 
also not be reduced to the so called contradiction between “productive power 
(Produktivkräfte)” and “production relations” (Produktionverhältnisse). But the relation of 
power is also not a “structural” one, since Foucault refuses, like Althusser, to base it simply 
on the division between “synchrony” and “diachrony”, coming from Saussure and developed 
in France by Levi-strauss, during the sixties. Such a separation would lead to the idea that 
there is something like an atemporal theory of power which can be isolated in the eternal 
present of an objective structure3.   
A relation of power is immanent to a social and technological device which is not a structure, 
but “a system”, or “a network”. A “dispositif” is not only a “network” it is also a social and 
historical “process” in which time is acting, and in which it is just impossible to define the 
present, as a complete simultaneity of events. There is a plurality of presents in each present 
that are paradoxically not contemporaneous, since the first one could be passed when the 
other occurs. A society is a space in which history has also geography, so that various 
presents exist at the same location, and are not homogeneous. Nobody can make the theory of 
such a device at one moment. The philosopher itself is thinking from inside what the 
“dispositif” could be, and not from outside. That is why philosophy is more “genealogy”, than 
“theory”:  
 
“Dans cette activité qu’on peut dire généalogique, vous voyez qu’en fait il ne s’agit 
aucunement d’opposer à l’unité abstraite de la théorie la multiplicité des faits ; il ne s’agit 
aucunement de disqualifier le spéculatif pour lui opposer, dans la forme d’un scientisme 
quelconque, la rigueur de connaissances bien établies. Foucault, DE, p165» 
 
We will examine now several aspects of this genealogy of power, as an immanent relation in a 
technical and social complex network of elements.  
 
A- Extended Power 
 
First of all, power is an “extension” of the external relation between the State and the society. 
In Surveiller et punir, “punishment” and “discipline” are “extensions” of justice, since the 
power of the Norm_ established and institutionalised by disciplinary devices_ is an 
“extension” of the power of the Law. It must be specified that when Foucault speaks of norm, 
it has nothing to do with an objective statistical regularity. It is nothing but an individual rule 
produced, discussed and accepted by any human agent.  
This new power is also “coextensive” to the whole society (Foucault, 1975, p 84). Extension 
is not suppression, and this word doesn’t have any dialectical meaning. In a way power is 
repression coming from the top, in another way discipline and punishment are 
                                                 
2 « Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen entsprechenden Bewusstseinsformen 
behalten hiermit nicht länger den Schein der Selbständigkeit. Sie haben keine Geschichte, sie haben keine 
Entwicklung, sondern die ihr materielle Produktion und ihrer materiellen Verkehr entwickelnden Menschen 
ändern mit dieser ihrer Wirklichkeit auch ihr Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens. Nicht das Bewusstsein 
bestimmt das Leben, sondern das Leben bestimmt das Bewusstsein“ (Karl Marx, 1972). 
3 See Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 1983. 
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“assujettissement” coming from the down, since they are accepted, discussed and modified by 
any human agents.  
 
It should be noted first, that the concept of “generalised punishment” (1975, pp 87-122) is 
genealogically attested, in contrast with the monarchist expression of sovereignty symbolised 
as “the right to kill”, through the execution of Damiens mentioned at the beginning of the 
book. Power is initially organised like a theatre in which Damiens performs negative role; it is 
just a symbolic and non effective form of power in which the King stays outside the society. 
With “generalised punishment”, a new “semiotic” of power replaces the old one. What is 
maximised is not punishment; it is the adequate relation between punishment and damage and 
the individualisation of punishment that cannot be directly codified (Foucault emphasizes the 
concept of “recidivist”). It is also punishment’s publicity and more generally “the 
representation” of punishment not only for the guilty, but also for all other people in the 
society. Effects are also signs understood by individuals that actively participate to the 
punishment process (Foucault, 1975, p 107).  
Yet the real extension of the macropower into a network of social and physical micropowers 
is expressed by “disciplines” and symbolised by Foucault’s interpretation of the Panopticon 
device invented by Jeremy Bentham (1785). It is symbolized, since this genealogy of power is 
also an interpretation and an evaluation, like in Nietzsche’s perspective. In a way, the 
Panopticon is something like an ideal machine invented before the real existence of a prison 
system in occident (around 1840): 
 
“Le dispositif panoptique n’est pas simplement une charnière, un échangeur entre un 
mécanisme de pouvoir et une fonction; c’est une manière de faire fonctionner des relations de 
pouvoir dans une fonction, et une fonction par ces relations de pouvoir » (1975, 208).  
 
The Panopticon is not merely a punishment function; it works as a disciplinary device: what 
does matter is not the punishment, but the fact that the prisoner knows that he can be sawn 
and controlled without to know how and why. In a certain way, it is not necessary, that 
somebody could really be here. The centre of the power is anonymous. It is not the power of 
somebody. Thus, the prisoner is not simply punished; he knows that he is. He knows that he is 
known and sawn.  
Yet in another way, an inspector can come here, visit the prison, making assessment work and 
considering that the physician, or the prison director must be replaced. It is the power itself, 
then, that can be assessed and judged by the society. Thus, in a way the Panopticon is closed, 
but in another way it is simultaneously open, and it can also be judged by the whole society. 
The dispositif producing values and assessments has also to be evaluated. It works as a will in 
which and for which all values have to be evaluated_ like the so-called Nietzsche’s will of 
power_ but it works also as a simple machine.  
 
At this level and by analogy, Foucault builds a new assumption: the structure of the 
Panopticon doesn’t specify only a pattern of Prison, Panopticon can also be “extended” as a 
pattern for the whole society:  
 
“Il s’agit aussi de montrer comment on peut “désenfermer” les disciplines et les faire 
fonctionner de façon diffuse, multiple, polyvalente dans le corps social tout entier” (Foucault, 
1975, 210).  
 
On one hand the punishment power is closed. It comes from the top. But on the other one, it is 
open, and it comes from the disciplinary micropowers. Universities, Schools, Hospitals, 
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Prisons, Caserns, are technical and institutional disciplinary devices disseminated into the 
society. But such micropowers are everywhere. Police is a very good example. Police is 
regulated by the State, but also by the people (Foucault, 1975, p 250). Discipline works as an 
immanent power present in architectural devices: not only prisons, but also asylums, caserns 
or schools. It works as various techniques of control and management that will “compare” 
“ordinate” and “make differentiations” in the people, and sometimes also “exclude” or 
“punish”. At school, in the army, activities are codified, exercises are required. Individual and 
social bodies are shaped in various specific and complex chrono-topological structures that 
we will try to better understand. 
 
B- The strategy is constructed by the machinery of power. 
 
From where, comes such an impersonal strategy?  First of all, the relation of power is not a 
property; it is a “game” that can just be described as an articulation between various “tactics” 
and a strategic plane of immanence:  
 
“L’étude de cette microphysique suppose que le pouvoir qui s’y exerce ne soit pas conçu 
comme une propriété, mais comme une stratégie” (Foucault, 1975, p 31).  
 
The relation of power cannot be reduced to any propositional function f(x) or f(x,y), since the 
relation is immanent to the relata. Like Gilbert Simondon said, “the relation doesn’t have any 
being”. “It get’s a value of being” when it works4. “Power” is nothing as an essence, or a 
substance. It starts to be, when it acts, and more precisely when “someone is acting on the 
action of another one”: 
 
“Une relation de violence agit sur un corps, sur des choses: elle force, elle plie, elle brise, elle 
détruit: elle referme toutes les possibilités; elle n’a donc auprès d’elle d’autre pôle que celui 
de la passivité ; et si elle rencontre une résistance, elle n’a d’autre choix que d’entreprendre de 
la réduire. 
Une relation de pouvoir, en revanche, s’articule sur deux éléments qui lui sont indispensables 
pour être justement une relation de pouvoir : « que « l’autre » (celui sur lequel elle s’exerce) 
soit bien reconnu comme sujet d’action ; et que s’ouvre devant la relation de pouvoir, tout un 
champ de réponses, réactions, effets, inventions possibles »5.  
 
Power is not force or violence. It means “assujettissement”, since it triggers also a 
“subjectivation” process. Through such a relation, power is not an abstract law, but a norm 
lived and accepted by people, since it is made and performed by people. As a first effect of 
power, the norm is singularised, individualised, by any human being.  
 
It means of course, that coming up from the inter-individual level to the level of the dispositif 
itself, we must admit that men are not only determined by the relation of power. They are 
conditioned by it because they condition it6. Micropowers are coming from down and not 
from the top. It means that they are coming from men. They are constructed by individuals. 
Finally, there is not a single basis and a single top:  
 
                                                 
4 Simondon, 1964.  
5 Michel Foucault, Dits et Ecrits, II, Paris, Gallimard (2001) : 1055.  
6 « Que les relations de pouvoir sont intriquées dans d‟autres types de relations ( de production, d‟alliance, de 
famille, de sexualité) où elles jouent à la fois un rôle de conditionnant et de conditionné » (Foucault, 2001, 425).  
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“D’accord, mais ce que j’ai voulu dire, c’est que pour qu’il y ait mouvement du haut en bas, il 
faut qu’il y ait eu en même temps une capillarité de bas en haut » (Foucault, 2001, 304).  
 
In a way individuals are the basis, and the “dispositif” the top. It is well expressed by the 
Panopticon design.  
Thus, on one hand, individuals are controlled by the device. Yet on the other one, the device 
itself is controlled by the society, and the relation of power is open! The structure of power 
itself is represented, analysed and evaluated by the society, like a will that exist without any 
subject. This will evaluates all value, just because it is evaluated by people at the same time! 
Individual are not the mere effects of the relation of power, through the normalisation process. 
They are also causes in a specific form of reciprocal causation that has nothing to do with 
classical physics, but that have connexions with Simondon’s analyse (1964) of phase 
transitions in physics, or Canguilhem’s analyse of “normativity” in biology (1943).  
Let’s insist on this very point. One could say that, even if we are our own judge at the first 
person, we are simultaneously determined at the third one. At our subjective level we seem to 
be free, but at a higher level we would be described, as “assujettis” by the normalisation 
structure. In this case normalisation process would be acted and “lived” by our subjective 
consciousness and it could also be described and “naturalized” as a generic and objective 
property of a social network.  
Such an assumption would work if we would accept that the level of consciousness and the 
level of the objective network can be easily decoupled. But it is not the case! There is no 
objective and atemporal structure of power independent of us, like in the structuralist 
analyse7.  And yet, at the same time, the power is not the strategy of any subjective entity. 
That’s the paradox.  
 
We will try to find some elements in order to solve it. Power is not a “disposition”, or a 
“faculty”. It is surely an immanent relation expressed in the social corpus (Foucault, 1975, p 
31), but individuals produce this network of micropowers. There is no central point, no unique 
source of sovereignty. It doesn’t mean that the power can be reduced to interpersonal relations 
between individuals.  
There is a goal, an aim, or a strategy, since something is “maximised”. In Surveiller et punir, 
it is called “utility” (Foucault,1975, p 223). However, this concept doesn’t have anything to 
do with the “utility value” in classical economy. Utility here means “normalisation”. Our 
societies are more and more normalised: that’s the aim of the big strategy, of the big will. Yet 
this immanent will is also an effect produced in the network. That is why it is not coming 
from the top.  
On one hand it is an immanent cause, but on the other one, it is an “event” emerging in a 
history, and not a substance or an essential reality. Strategic properties are just effects of the 
“dispositif disciplinaire”, as a self-organised structure. They are not coming first. They 
emerge from the internal relation between the shape of the relation of power and its 
functioning. The structural shape of the relation of power is not atemporal. It is defined by its 
potential changes coming from history. The structural shape is also a changing one, and 
strategy has only a meaning in a genealogical way of thinking. There is no original strategy. 
There is no will of power differentiating values and forces that would not be also a 
differentiated event having a sense, but no essence. The principle is also an event: this 
conception of immanence is common to Deleuze and Foucault. The metaphysical cause is 
nothing but a natural and a social effect, constructed in a chrono-topological structure. That is 
why the power is not coming from the top, and also not coming from the down, since there is 
                                                 
7 Stephane Legrand uses the concept of « surdétermination » to explain this (2007, p 21): “il faut observer un jeu 
mobile où chaque côté est simultanément déterminé et déterminant par rapport à l‟autre”.  
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no structural hierarchy able to define a priori what the relation of power is. There is no 
transcendental principle, no “condition de possibilité du pouvoir” (Foucault, 1976, p 122). 
Power is “middle out”. He comes from everywhere but he is nowhere: 
 
“Omniprésence du pouvoir: non point parce qu’il aurait le privilège de tout regrouper sous 
son invincible unité, mais parce qu’il se produit à chaque instant, en tout point, ou plutôt dans 
toute relation d’un point à un autre. Le pouvoir est partout ; ce n’est pas qu’il englobe tout, 
c’est qu’il vient de partout » (Foucault, 1976, p 122).  
 
And yet the paradox is not completely solved, because the hierarchy between micro and 
macro level is not completely erased by Foucault. We will come back to this important point 
later. At the same time he writes in the same book and fast at the same page, that the relation 
between dominant and dominated is not a real “matrix of power”.  
On one hand, the impersonal network of micropowers comes from everywhere. It is also an 
immanent cause and an effect of its working. But on the other hand, the relation between the 
macropower and the micropower is like a relation between a real, and an illusory shape of 
power8, or between a real level of efficiency, and another level that is nothing but an “an 
hegemonic effect of redistribution” (Foucault, 1976, p 124). Would macropower distributions 
be simple epiphenomena, or real differential shapes and values? Shall we characterize for 
instance the repressive macropower and the model of representative sovereignty as a certain 
kind of “mereological supervenience”?  
 
C- The transformation matrix 
 
Let‟s come back now to the most important point. What would be the difference between 
punishment and discipline, or between the law and the norm?  
Normalisation needs subjectivation. It is instituted by a subject. In this way of thinking, it 
seems to be similar to the Canguilhem‟s concept of “normativity”, which doesn‟t have any 
objective value, since is also firstly instituted by somebody (Canguilhem, 1966, p 77), and 
finally by “life” itself (Canguilhem, 1966, pp 78-79). However, life is also polarity. It prefers 
health to decease. It produces a difference between positive and negative values, and thus it 
eliminates. Complexity or life comes from the fact that it is also a process that will overcomes 
the initial difference between health and decease, since health needs decease and pathology 
for structural and not for conjuncture reasons. There is no health without illness.  
However, in normalisation, there is simultaneously a subjectivication and an objectivation 
process. On one hand the power selects. But normalisation is not repression. It doesn‟t 
exclude a class of human beings. It assumes on the contrary, that a class of citizen is excluded 
by the law and by the repressive macro mechanism of power; and nevertheless it integrates it 
in the society. Normalisation is information and control. It is a discrepant extension of 
repression, since repression excludes what normalisation integrates. Thus, for instance, 
generalised punishment is paradoxically not a mere punishment. It adds new rules to the 
juridical laws: a minimal quantity principle, the principle of sufficient idealisation, of lateral 
effects, of perfect certainty (Foucault, 1975, p 97), etc. It is the “representation of 
punishment”, and not the punishment itself that is maximised through such rules (Foucault, 
1975, p 97). And it works not only for the guilty, but for the whole society.  
Normalisation appears through a new “transformation matrix” (Foucault, 1976, p 131): power 
generates knowledge, and knowledge will generate power. Through normalisation, 
                                                 
8 See Legrand 2007, p 38. 
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subjectivation is instituted, but as a source of power. Subjectivation is also controlled, and in a 
way negated _ even if not suppressed_ by an objectivation process. It is shaped in the 
discipline and punishment machinery. We act on our own, and yet we are an element in a 
strategy of maximisation. We are the instrument of an objective will that is not ours. That is 
why human sciences come from the disciplines. They are produced by a general and social 
requirement inherent to the immanent network of micropowers. Through economy, medicine, 
psychology and psychiatry, we are shaped as subjects. That‟s the paradox: we are not shaped 
as objects, but as subjects. It means firstly that knowledge is discipline, technology, and not 
pure theory. It is not outside its field of investigation. It means also that knowledge is power. 
It shapes human being and human behaviour. It changes our individual and social bodies.  
Finally there is no subjectivation without normalisation, and thus without information and 
control. Yet on the other hand, all disciplines are pure techniques, even as human sciences. 
They are not atemporal theories. There is no “invisible hand” in Foucault‟s universe. And 
what is maximised is normalisation, and not collective utility. We understand why now: 
objectivation is a result of a collective process and techniques, and not a substantial 
principle of rationality. There are just objectivation effects and no a complete objectivity. 
Objectivation and subjectivation are both incomplete dimensions of the relation of power 
connected through the transformation matrix.  
That is why it is an immanent and not a transcendent one. Immanence means here: an “inside” 
that is also “outside”, or a “determinant” that is paradoxically also “determined”. Smith‟s 
invisible hand, or Laplace‟s Demon are nothing but metaphysical entities. They symbolize a 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. For Foucault, power needs a will, yet this will itself is an 
effect of the network, and not a metaphysical cause. The constructive relation between the 
initial description of such a network and its functioning can only define it. It is what it acts. 
That is why it is obviously open and incomplete.  
Power is not force and violence. Can we give one more precise proof of this? Foucault is not 
Canguilhem (1966) or Bergson (1959). He refuses to rend the relation of power “creative”, or 
“normative”9. But the concept of normalisation has to very different meanings. The first one 
is just the idea that our individual or collective body is controlled and educated through 
disciplines.  
Yet he also insists on the fact that power includes resistance to power, and thus contra powers. 
In this way of thinking, it is inherent to the normalisation process, that we get the ability to be 
opposed to it. That is why he concludes that “an open relation of power” produces “a field of 
answers, reactions, effects, or possible inventions” (2001, 1055).  Invention is not creation, 
but it assumes the ability for the relation of power to overcome itself. It also assumes finally 
the ability that power would not be only a network of constraints, but also a system of norms 
that people would evaluate and criticize. We can react partially on this impersonal will, on 
this strategy without any strategist.  
 
2- Biopower 
 
In La volonté de Savoir, Foucault introduces the concept of “biopower” (1976; p184, p189). 
Yet, the first aim of the book is to understand the dispositif of Sexuality as « an extension » of 
the dispositif of Alliance (Foucault, 1976, p140). There are strong connexions between 
“sexuality” and “disciplines”, yet this “dispositif” shows new important developments that we 
will emphasize.  
                                                 
9 See on this point Guillaume Leblanc, 2004.  
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Foucault‟s analyse starts with the expression and analyse of a discrepancy between “Scientia 
sexualis” and “Confession” (Aveu). The “dispositif” of Alliance is focused on reproduction, 
on family, on a hierarchical vision of society based on the so-called “Droit du sang”.  
Yet, there is a new form of Will emerging through the Modern Period. And it starts with the 
question of Confession, since it introduces what Foucault calls “a regime of truth” into the 
dispositif of power. It is not only that the power is accepted, lived and internalized, by our 
body as “a prisoner” of our soul. The relation of power is rended “true” for us, as something 
that we can try to recognize. We take it as such. Something in the relation of power is not only 
turned on the power, but also on us10. It is not only in our body, but also in our consciousness.  
Such a relation has obviously an ethical meaning; it is not only the expression of a political 
control on our bodies.  
However, Scientia sexualis is opposed to the relation of power, and it introduces new rules 
concerning knowledge of us as such. Scientia sexualis is an objectivation of “the will of 
knowledge”, that is not only “a will of social control”. This will is turned on knowledge, or 
more precisely on the knowledge of us. What is going on in such a reflective motion? Are we 
coming back to a philosophy of consciousness? Certainly not!  
The will of knowledge is objectived through various rules and disciplines. It concerns firstly 
“the nervous woman”, or “the child sexuality”, “specification of perverse people” and then 
“the control of births”. What would be the great secret around sexuality? Would it be the sex 
itself? The sex stays here as a natural organ without any secret and any interest. The dispositif 
of sexuality produces a specific answer to the problem of the self, as we could have any 
knowledge of it. The problem is coming indeed from the fact that knowledge is the mystery, 
and not the solution.  
On one hand, the “subjectivation” by the dispositif of sexuality “constitutes human being as 
subjects” (Foucault, 1976, p 81). Yet this reflexion on ourselves, this attempt to understand 
us better, this need of knowledge and of freedom, is not controlled by ourselves. It is 
completely constructed by the dispositif of sexuality. What is the great mystery around this? 
How can we better understand that the knowledge of ourselves is paradoxically not founded 
on ourselves? Does it be founded merely on a social and political “dispositif” of power? The 
answer is: no. In a way this reflexion is recreating us, as individuals and also as collective 
entity. A new form of sovereignty is at work in the dispositif of Sexuality: “le droit de faire 
vivre”. 
 
“Le droit de faire vivre” is not merely a “normalisation” process. It is more. A new extension 
appears, that cannot be completely explained by the “Umwertung” of the representative 
macro sovereignty into a social and technical network of micropowers. Such a system works 
only at the level of individuals and of society. Of course; Foucault said often that such a 
micropower network was like a big “machine”, and that he tried to make a microphysics of 
power. But the word “physics” was just strange and not useful, since the power had at the 
same time “a soul”, even as a simple “physical soul”. At this level nothing threatened the 
division between natural and social sciences or between the world of atoms and cells, and the 
world of human relationships. In la Volonté de Savoir, Foucault adds some new developments 
and precisions on the structure of power. It is coming from the top again, and again also from 
the down (Foucault, 1976, p 83). But what is the down here?  
The down is nothing but biological constraints. Sexuality symbolizes an incredible trend to 
reflect our biological constraints into social and political norms. In a way sexuality is coming 
from sex, but in another way, it reflects sex, as a way for the humanity to control its own 
                                                 
10 It is a new step of subjectivation that was not present in Surveiller et Punir (1975). See on this point Dreyfus 
and Rabinow: “enfin j‟ai cherché à étudier la manière dont l‟homme a appris à se connaître a appris à se 
reconnaître comme sujet « d‟une sexualité » (1984, p 298).  
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biological traits individually and collectively. Thus sex is not only the base. Sex is socially, 
politically and also ethically constructed and controlled by the dispositif of sexuality. 
Biological constraints are not specifying only biological facts. Since we can act and react on 
it, they become also ethical and political norms. A new great classical distinction is threatened 
by this development. As the separation between State and society was attacked by the 
disciplinary dispositif, the separation between facts and values is discussed by the dispositif of 
sexuality. The sex is now a fact and also a value: that’s the big secret which requires a new 
regime of truth in the contemporary society. It concerns us as individuals, but also as 
populations. What is going on, here? It’s nothing but our place in Nature. 
It is not merely politics; it is ecology. And what is the difference? There is a new asymmetry 
in this relation of power. It concerns our relations with new generations, and not only the 
relation between individuals in the present. The old definition of power was: “acting on action 
of others”. Yet this relation can purely be characterized as a topological one, since it is 
implicitly assumed that “other people” also exist.  
Yet the new relation of power is characterized by a chrono-topological asymmetry, since it 
concerns the relation between the humanity and future generations. However, future 
generations don’t exist today. They will just exist tomorrow. Such a relation requires 
obviously an extended form of social/natural physics, since it cannot be represented in a 
classical space, based on invariance and symmetry. We need to reshape the framework in 
which we understood firstly Nature, in order to explain it. One will speak “as if” the future 
generations were here, and here they are not. What they will be is reflected by us. It is not 
simply naturally determined.  
 
And here we are led to a last big ambiguity. We would ask a question to Foucault: since a 
biopower is a reflection of biology in politics and since it concerns the humanity as species, 
and not only as a collection of individuals. Through this new relation, would the future of 
humanity not be obviously the object of a representation, or of a reflection? 
What each of us is doing today, concerns the future of humanity as a collective entity 
tomorrow. We will argue that this problem cannot be treated only through social and technical 
procedures of control, since humanity is now shaped and also represented as a value into the 
relation of power. This new extension concerns the come back from the control procedures, 
to the representation relation. 
Foucault‟s position was not clear on this point. We remember, that in a way the micropower 
network was real, and the macro power sovereignty a symbol. Foucault draws up an inverted 
hierarchy between effective micropower and symbolic macropower. We argue that the 
question of biopower needs a new extension and a new inversion. We need to think the 
control procedure as reflected into a representative structure. If it would not be the case, we 
could be led to treat the future of humanity only as a technical biological problem, and not as 
a political question. And we have shown precisely, that since in the biopower relation biology 
is reflected by politics, humanity cannot be simply a fact; it is obviously also a value and a 
problem for humanity itself.  
Thus we must conclude for a new good reason now, that control procedure are the top in a 
way, but they are also the base for a new representation structure in another way. That is 
why we don‟t need only a description of biopolitics in terms of “dispositif” or of Strategy 
without strategist. We need a democratic characterisation of the biopower by representative 
and citizens. And we need democratic representations reflected into procedures, juridical laws 
and administrative commissions. Our position is obviously not a come back to the old and 
abstract representation of power, since what we need is already partially constructed through 
and by the democratic contemporary societies! This new Domain was not really thought by 
Foucault, and it is open to us today. The precautionary principle is inserted in the French 
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constitution, and in European institutions. The obligation to respect the human body; and the 
preservation of the human genome were not only discussed as bioethical questions. They are 
now effectively introduced in the French “bio-law” (Fagot-Largeault/Miquel, 1995).   
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